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T

he future of the VAT is digital.1 In the foreseeable future, all VAT processes will be automated. VAT determinations, collection, the remission of funds, as well as all reporting, audit, and
refund activities will be digitized.2 Certified proprietary and third-party software systems will perform

1
A digital VAT is inevitable simply because modern business systems are digital. In 2000 the University of California
at Berkeley’s School of Information Management Systems
conducted the first study of newly created information and
demonstrated that 93 percent of the three billion gigabytes of
data generated worldwide (using 1999 data) was computergenerated. Updated in 2002, a new study reached much the
same conclusions, and indicated (using 2001 and 2002 data)
‘‘about 5 exabytes of new information [was] created in 2002.
Ninety-two percent of the new information was stored on
magnetic media, mostly hard disks. . . . film represented 7%
of the total, paper 0.01%, and optical media 0.002%.’’ Thus, it
may be presumed that almost all enterprise-source data
content for operations, accounting, audit, as well as tax filing,
financial reporting, regulatory submissions, and almost all
other purposes is digitized both in generation and in storage.
Eric Woodman, Information Generation: Berkeley study measures gargantuan information boom, EMC2, available at
http://www.emc.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2006), referencing
School of Information Management and Systems at the University of California at Berkeley, ‘‘How Much Information?’’
(2000). Peter Lyman and Hal R. Varian, Executive Summary,
School of Information Management and Systems at the University of California at Berkeley, ‘‘How Much Information?’’
(2003) (Oct. 27, 2003) available at http://www.sims.berkeley.
edu (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
2
The OECD published two guidance notes in May 2005
that set out a comprehensive description of the standard
audit file for tax compliance checking and standards to be
applied to the development of tax accounting software. See
‘‘Guidance for the Standard Audit File — Tax; Guidance on
Tax Compliance for Business and Accounting Software,’’
available at http://www.oecd.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
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all critical VAT functions for large and small taxpayers at minimal cost under real-time compliance
conditions. Government-to-government information
exchange will be immediate.
The European Union is transitioning to a digital
VAT now.3 Analogous, fully digital consumption tax
systems are already in place and functioning in the
retail sales tax in several American jurisdictions.4
Carousel fraud exploits the lingering noncertified, nondigital attributes of the EU VAT at an
estimated annual cost of 10 percent of net VAT

3
Digitizing the VAT in Europe is part of the ‘‘Lisbon
Strategy’’ (European Commission, eEurope — An Information
Society for All, COM(2000) 130 final). The goal is to make the
European Union a more competitive, dynamic knowledgebased economy, with improved employment and social cohesion by 2010. (Communication from the commission to the
council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social
Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, eEurope 2005:
An Information Society for All. An Action Plan to be Presented
in view of the Sevilla European Council, 21/22 June 2002.
COM(2002) 263 final).
Numerous changes have been made in the Sixth Directive
in line with the Lisbon Strategy. The ‘‘Invoicing Directive,’’
Council Directive 2001/115/EC of December 20, 2001 (2001/
115/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 15) 24) and the ‘‘Digital Sales Directive,’’
Council Directive 2002/38/EC of May 7, 2002 (2002/38/EC,
2002 O.J. (L 128) 41 were crucial to moving the European VAT
in the digital direction. Together they provide for digital
notices, digital returns, and digital periodic and recapitulative statements, as well as digital third-party prepared invoices.
4
The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA)
came into effect on October 1, 2005. SSUTA began in March
2000 as the Streamlined Sales Tax Project. It responded to
the states’ perception that they were losing sales tax revenue
from increasing online sales. A centralized online registration
system and an amnesty for qualifying sellers came into effect,
but the certification of software service providers that was
expected in 2005 was delayed until April 2006. The SSUTA
has an initial governing board of 18 states: Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. The stated goal of SSUTA is to simplify and
modernize sales and use tax administration. When fully
operational, it’s expected to reduce the burden of tax compliance on all sellers by fully digitizing the retail sales tax
process. See http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org.
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Carousel Fraud
Carousel (missing trader intracommunity, or
MTIC) fraud works when a seller (A) in member
state X makes an exempt intracommunity supply of
goods to a (soon to be) missing trader (B) in member
state Y. B acquires the goods without paying VAT
and later makes a domestic supply to a third company (C). C is frequently called the broker. B collects
VAT on its sale to C, the broker, but doesn’t pay the
VAT to the government. B disappears with the VAT.
When C claims an input credit on the VAT it paid
to B, the missing trader, the government suffers the
loss. In a fully operational carousel, C will resell the
goods back across the border to the initial seller, A.
That sale is also an exempt intracommunity supply.
The same goods can then be sold once again on the
carousel to B. When A, B, and C are operating in
tandem and are aware of the fraud, it’s a relatively

5
Report from the commission to the council and the European Parliament on the use of administrative cooperation
arrangements in the fight against VAT fraud, COM(2004) 260
final at 5.
6
‘‘The [U.K.] government has suffered its first annual fall
in VAT revenues since it started collecting the tax in 1973
because of a big rise in so-called ‘carousel’ fraud, raising fears
that the scams are spiralling out of control.
Official data yesterday showed that VAT revenues tumbled
nearly 14 percent in March compared with March last year. In
the full fiscal year they were down 0.2 percent to £72.9bn —
the first full-year drop. The fall in revenues is remarkable
given that the economy has had two severe recessions since
the early 1970s that did not cause VAT revenues to drop.’’
Ashley Seager and Angela Balakrishnan, ‘‘Fears Over Fraud
as VAT Receipts Slump,’’ The Guardian (Apr. 25, 2006) at 1,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,
1760816,00.html.
7
A digital VAT has been proposed as a new U.S. federal
level tax to the President’s Advisory Panel for Federal Tax
Reform. Richard T. Ainsworth, ‘‘The Digital VAT: A Proposal
for the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform’’ (‘‘A
Digital VAT (D-VAT) for the U.S.?’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 22, 2005,
p. 938). The detailed proposal is available at Richard T.
Ainsworth, ‘‘The Digital VAT (D-VAT),’’ Virginia Tax Review
(2006), forthcoming.
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easy matter to apply joint and several liability
provisions and hold C liable for the VAT not remitted
by B.8
A common practice has developed whereby legitimate companies called ‘‘buffers’’ are placed between
the key operatives in the scheme to both distort
trading patterns and make investigations difficult,
and to make it more difficult to apply the joint and
several liability provisions in VAT statutes. Buffers
may be completely unaware of the fraud, although
with the irregularity of the transactions, they may
suspect, but have no direct knowledge, that something is amiss.
The diagram above illustrates a typical carousel
fraud scheme. Company A in France sells to Company B in the United Kingdom goods that are
invoiced at 1,000. Because this is an intracommunity supply, the supply is zero-rated out of France,
and Company B is obligated to self-assess the VAT
due — (17.5 percent)(1,000) = 175. This amount is
never reported or remitted to the government as
Company B intends to become a ‘‘missing trader.’’
Seeking an immediate resale, Company B sells the
goods to Company C at 950, collecting VAT on the
invoice issued — (17.5 percent)(950) = 166.25. The
total received by B will be 950 + 166.25 = 1,116.25.
This amount is sufficient for Company B to pay the
invoice to Company A (1,000) and retain the difference (116.25). To complete the carousel, Company C
would sell the same goods back to Company A for
970, allowing a modest profit of 20. Because this sale
is an intracommunity supply, the amount will be
zero-rated. Company C will file a return seeking a
full refund. It will provide valid invoices that show
an input VAT payment of 166.25 against an output
VAT of zero.

8
On March 14, 2006, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo
Colmer of the European Court of Justice issued an opinion in
the joined cases of Axel Kittel and Recolta Recycling (Cases
C-439/04 and C-440/04). Those cases considered the effectiveness of joint and several liability provisions in a range of
carousel fraud permutations. Referring to the earlier judgment of the ECJ in the joined cases of Optigen, Fulcrum, and
Bond House Systems (Cases C-354/03, C-355/03, and C-484/
03), the AG concluded that a taxable person who in good faith
purchases goods without knowledge of a fraud committed by
the seller cannot be deprived of the right to deduction.
However, the AG distinguished between when a taxable
person is aware of fraud, but stands apart (without gaining
any advantage), and when a taxable person actively participates in the fraud and gains advantages unlawfully. In the
latter situation, if a member state had introduced joint and
several liability based on article 21(3) of the Sixth Directive,
legal sanctions under joint and several liability provisions
would apply. According to the AG, two indicators are of special
interest — the illegal benefit to the person claiming the right
to deduction and his closeness to the fictitious operation.
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receipts.5 In the United Kingdom alone, carousel
fraud cost the Exchequer between £1.12 billion and
£1.9 billion in the 2004-2005 financial year, and it is
considered to be the cause of the first annual fall in
VAT revenues since the tax was introduced in the
United Kingdom.6 This article proposes that carousel fraud be eliminated in the European Union
through selective insertion of digital VAT7 functionality into the current system. In other words, it is
proposed that the digital future be accelerated. The
cost of that implementation would be minimal when
compared to current revenue losses.
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Purchase Invoice
(Self-Assessed?)
Sale Invoice
Price
1,000
VAT (0%)
0
1,000
Total

Co. A

Co. B
Missing Trader

Price
1,000
VAT (17.5%) 175
Total
1,175

Sales Invoice
Price
950.00
VAT (17.5%) 166.25
Total
1,116.25

Co. C
Sales Invoice
Price
VAT (0%)
Total

970
0
970

France
Proposed Solutions
The 1993 abolition of border controls between
member states removed the administrative mechanism that verified entitlement to zero rating upon
export, as well as the obligation to pay VAT on
import. VAT payment is now deferred when goods
cross EU borders. That deferral breaks the VAT
chain at a particularly vulnerable spot: the interface
of domestic and foreign tax administrations. Considered theoretically, deferral is a major exception to
the fractional payment principle on which the VAT is
based. It should surprise no one that this change
opened the door to carousel fraud.
The search for solutions has taken two paths, one
in the structure of the tax, the second in its administration. Structural solutions don’t have full support of the European Commission. Some of those
solutions fragment the system even more by increasing (rather than decreasing) the volume of VAT-free
commodities in circulation. Others impose unacceptably high burdens on honest traders. The commission’s preference is for administrative solutions.
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United Kingdom
Unfortunately, those solutions rely on a degree of
technological agility and intergovernmental cooperation that currently appears more aspirational
than realistic.
The Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the
University of Munich examined structural solutions
to carousel fraud at its Tax Policy Conference on
September 29, 2003. The proposals included: the
Mittler model, a preliminary stage exemption for
transactions between businesses with input-tax deduction rights; a reverse charge with input tax
settlement model; and a reverse charge with joint
and several tax liability model.9 Hans-Werner Sinn,
president of the Ifo Institute, presented two additional ‘‘pay first’’ models: a model requiring actual
payment of VAT on all (or selected) intracommunity

9

Andrea Gebauer, Chang Woon Nam, and Rüdiger Parsche, Can New Models of Value Added Taxation Stop the VAT
Revenue Shortfalls? 8-12, 60th Congress of the International
Institute of Public Finance, Aug. 23-26, 2004, Thailand.
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Carousel Fraud
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A common practice has developed
whereby legitimate companies,
called ‘buffers,’ are placed
between the key operatives in the
scheme.
When the commission took up the carousel fraud
issue soon after the conclusion of the Ifo conference,
it responded to each proposal and pronounced none
of them to be compelling.11 The commission recommended that administrative steps be taken to make
intensive use of the administrative cooperation machinery, allocate more human resources to multilateral controls, reduce the average response time to
mutual assistance requests, adopt computerized auditing techniques as soon as possible, and set up
national fraud departments empowered to exchange
information with other member states.12 In the
commission’s view, new Regulation (EEC) 1798/
2003, which entered into force on January 1, 2004,
was positioned to resolve the VAT fraud problem
through the facilitation of substantive information
exchange under clear procedures and binding
rules.13

to be the adoption of domestic reverse charge procedures similar to those discussed at the Ifo conference.16
Article 21(1)(a) allows the general application of
the reverse charge mechanism to all supplies made
by nonresident suppliers deemed to be made within
a member state. Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Spain have recently availed themselves of that option. France will do the same, effective September 1,
2006.17
Austria has been the leading advocate for extending the reverse charge mechanism between resident
businesses in industry segments where missing
traders are common. Austria selectively derogated
from article 21(1)(a) in the construction sector. The
Austrian target was the subcontractor that frequently went missing after providing services for a
general contractor.18 Latvia has approached the
commission for a similar derogation, but one that
would cover supplies of goods and services for timber
transactions.19 Lithuania has also requested permission to derogate for timber, as well as for subcontractor construction work, supplies of goods and
services under an insolvency proceeding, and supplies of ferrous waste and scrap.20 The United Kingdom has submitted a request to apply a domestic

Hans-Werner Sinn, Andrea Gebauer, and Rüdiger Parsche, The Ifo Institute’s Model for Reducing VAT Fraud:
Payment First, Refund Later, CESifo Forum (Feb. 2004) 30-34
available at http://www.ifo.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo%
20Forum%202004/CESifo%20Forum%202/2004/forum2-04specials1.pdf.
11
COM(2004) 260 final, supra note 5, at 17.
12
Id. at 19.
13
Id. at 7.
14
For example, AGI Online reports that on March 28,
2006, Italian finance police shut down a €35 million carousel
fraud scheme in Rome that specialized in the fraudulent
importation of information technology and electronic goods,
available at http://www.agi.it/english/news.pl?doc=20060328
1644-1168-RT1-CRO-0-NF11&page=0&id=agionline-eng.
oggitalia.
15
The Sixth Council Directive of May 17, 1977, on the
harmonization of the laws of the member states on turnover

tax — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of
assessment (77/388/EEC) 1977 O.J. (L 145) 1; article 21(3)
generally allows member states to provide that someone other
than the person liable for payment of the VAT be held jointly
and severally liable. Thus, the United Kingdom recently
added joint and several liability provisions (VAT Act of 1994,
section 77A (U.K.)). Those provisions apply to businesses that
receive supplies of telephones, telephone parts, and accessories, as well as computer equipment and parts, accessories,
and software made after April 10, 2003. To be liable, the
business must know or have reason to suspect that the VAT
would go unpaid.
16
Fully developed, the reverse charge procedures under
discussion at the Ifo conference involve a system of ‘‘Rnumbers’’ issued to enterprises entitled to claim an input
credit. Sellers would use an online system to verify whether
or not a buyer was entitled to purchase goods tax-free.
Hans-Werner Sinn, supra note 9, at 30.
17
Patrick Donsimoni, ‘‘Finance Act Introduces VAT Reverse Charge Mechanism,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, Jan. 23, 2006, p.
266.
18
Prof. Markus Achatz, Linz University, reported on the
Austrian successes with the reverse charge in the construction industry at the Ifo’s Tax Policy Conference.
19
Commission of the European Communities, proposals
for a council decision authorizing Latvia to extend the application of a measure derogating from article 21 of the Sixth
Council Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of the
laws of the member states relating to turnover taxes,
COM(2005) 376 final (Aug. 18, 2005).
20
Commission of the European Communities, proposals
for a council decision authorizing Lithuania to extend the
application of a measure derogating from article 21 of the

(Footnote continued in next column.)

(Footnote continued on next page.)

Response of the Member States
Revenue pressures forced the member states
down both paths. Greater effort has gone into audit
enforcement14 and information exchange. Simultaneously, statutory changes have been proposed and
implemented. Joint and several liability provisions
have been added,15 but the favored change appears

10
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transactions, and a model tying input credit deductions to the actual remission of VAT by the supplier.10
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A Digital Solution
The superiority of the Ifo Institute’s ‘‘payment
first, refund later’’ model is that it ‘‘remains as close
as possible to the present system.’’23 Its most significant drawback is that an actual payment system
puts unacceptably high cash flow demands on legitimate businesses. Based on those concerns, the International Monetary Fund has recommended
against adoption of a similar system.24
However, if the Ifo Institute’s proposal is stripped
to its essentials, it’s a proposal premised on assurance, not necessarily on payment. What it seeks to
provide is assurance that the VAT is collected, and
assurance that the collected VAT is remitted to the
government. What if that level of assurance could be
secured administratively — that is, without instituting a system of actual payments?
Trusted third parties operating in a certified
environment can and do provide that level of assurance in the United States. Thus, certified technology

Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC on the harmonization of
the laws of the member states relating to turnover taxes,
COM(2006) 704 final (Jan. 10, 2006).
21
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, ‘‘BN 46 — Introduction of a Change of the Person Responsible for Accounting
for and Paying the VAT on the Sale of Certain Goods,’’
available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2006/bn46.htm.
22
Commission of the European Communities, proposals
for a council decision amending Directive 77/388/EEC as
regards certain measures to simplify the procedure for charging value added tax and to assist in countering tax evasion
and avoidance, and repealing certain Decisions granting
derogations, COM(2005) 89 final (Mar. 16, 2005).
23
Hans-Werner Sinn, supra note 9, at 31.
24
The Ifo Institute’s model has some similarity to the VAT
bank system adopted by Bulgaria in July 2002. The Bulgarian
system requires each taxpayer to open a VAT bank account
into which all VAT receipts and payments are made. The
Bulgarian system is not the strict ‘‘payment first’’ system
advocated by the Ifo Institute, because input credits are not
denied to any purchaser who follows procedures and makes
payments into seller’s VAT bank account. Nevertheless, the
IMF recommends against this approach because of the ‘‘loss of
working capital — business enterprises have identified this
as the most significant cost. Because funds held in VAT bank
accounts are frozen, businesses could, potentially, be forced to
seek short-term loan funds to support their cash flow needs.’’
Graham Harrison and Russell Krelove, VAT Refunds: A
Review of Country Experiences, IMF Working Paper WP/05/
218 (Nov. 2005) 31-33, 32.
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and trusted third-party service providers should be
able to do for the European Union what they’re
doing for the United States. If adopted, it would
eliminate carousel fraud. The American model is the
streamlined sales tax (SST).
From a European perspective, the SST is an
enhanced analogue of the digital sales directive.25
The critical difference is the American adoption of
certified solutions — certification of transaction tax
software and certification of service providers who
function as trusted third-party intermediaries. The
SST became operational late in 2005 with the adoption of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement by at least 10 states and 20 percent of the U.S.
population.

A certified digital VAT/trusted
third-party system would eliminate
carousel fraud in all targeted
business segments.
Article 26c of the Sixth VAT Directive provides for
an elective, fully digital compliance regime for crossborder transactions between businesses not established in the European Union and final consumers.
What would happen if the European Union were to
adopt a program that contained all the elements of
article 26c,26 but that would be mandatory for designated taxpayers (taxpayers from suspect industries like computer chips or cell phones in the United
Kingdom, timber in Latvia and Lithuania, subcontractor services in Austria), would require the use of
certified software by those enterprises in their tax
determinations, and would require that those enterprises use trusted third-party intermediaries for all
of their VAT compliance obligations (payments as
well as refunds)?
Would that technology-intensive solution — borrowed from the SST, merged with the Ifo Institute’s
proposals, and targeted at potential carousel fraud
operators — be able to eliminate carousel fraud?
Would it be an appropriate administrative replacement for the paper-based, physical inspection of the
border controls of 1993 that created the opening for
carousel fraud in the first place?

25

Sixth Council Directive, supra note 14, at article 26c.
The proposal would be a little broader than simply
mandating article 26c. It would need to mandate the adoption
of digital notices, digital returns, and digital periodic and
recapitulative statements (Council Directive 2002/38/EC).
Also, the use of digital invoices would be required (Council
Directive 2001/115/EC) and provided by the trusted thirdparty intermediary.
26
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reverse charge covering computer chips, cell phones,
and other electronic items.21 Although opposed to
the proliferation of exceptions to the principle of
fractional payment, the commission has proposed
optional use of the reverse charge mechanism in the
seven discrete categories that have been the subjects
of frequent derogation requests.22
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Specific Application
A certified digital VAT/trusted third-party system
would eliminate carousel fraud in all targeted business segments. As set forth in the earlier example,
carousel fraud works when a seller in member state
X zero rates and sells goods to a buyer in member
state Y, who immediately resells the same goods,
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collects the appropriate VAT, and disappears without filing a return, remitting VAT on purchases, or
reporting the VAT collected on sales.
Under the system proposed here, a business engaged in the intracommunity sale of computer chips
in member state X, for example, would be notified
that it was required to install certified VAT software
in its enterprise resource planning system or access
a free online encrypted program that would determine its VAT compliance (calculate the VAT, issue
electronic invoices, and submit VAT returns, as well
as VAT Information Exchange System Intrastat reports). Failure to do so would result in an inability to
zero rate its intracommunity sale of computer chips.
Purchasers of computer chips in member state Y
would be similarly notified. Failure on the part of
the buyer to use a certified system or to submit VAT
returns through a certified service provider would
result in denial of input credits on the forward sale
of chips within member state Y.
Under that proposal, the free market acts as an
enforcement buffer between the taxpayer and the
tax administration. Because certified service providers will assume all VAT filing and payment obligations of the taxpayer, the private sector will sort out
legitimate traders from illegitimate ones. Private
security arrangements will be worked out in advance among legitimate businesses that will place
funds at the disposal of the intermediary in time to
make payment with timely returns. In a worst-case
scenario, taxpayers will be in the same position with
cash flow and VAT compliance as they were before
the proposal was in place. However, in most cases,
they will be in a better position. They will no longer
be subject to audit or be responsible for determining
taxable amounts, submitting returns, or making
timely payments of funds. Not only will the burden
of compliance be lifted, but the cost and risks associated with VAT compliance will be significantly
reduced.
◆
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Certification of tax compliance software is not
just an American idea. The OECD released two
reports in May 2005, Guidance on Tax Compliance
for Business and Accounting Software and Facilitating Collection of Consumption Taxes on Business-toConsumer Cross-Border E-Commerce Transactions.
Both reports anticipate the certified software and
trusted third-party solution.
Under the model proposed here, the European
Commission would need to engage in a software and
trusted third-party certification program. Multiple
providers should be certified. Instead of allowing
derogations from the Sixth Directive to combat carousel fraud, the commission should direct member
states to technological and trusted third-party solutions, allowing use of those solutions to be required
by selected enterprises or commercial sectors
heavily engaged in suspect transactions. Enforcement would come through denial of input credits
based on the insufficiency of the invoice if enterprises required to report within the system remained outside.
Under the SST, proper use of certified software
effectively insulates the taxpayer from liability for
any errors in determining the proper tax due; certified third-party collecting agents are deemed directly liable to the government for the taxes on all
the transactions they process. They literally assume
all of the vendor’s tax collection functions. What
makes that system particularly attractive to businesses is that the SST provides those services to
vendors at no cost.

